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Ruv Draba's avatar

I'm glad to see this post Matt, and thank you for putting it up. Specific comments follow -- a mixture of reactions, reflections and quibbles. I realise that this work is already published. Any value in such commentary then may be in contribution to your further reflection and discussion, and I hope that some of it may be useful in that role.

> In reality, emotions are far more complex and integral to decision making than the simplistic dual-process perspective suggests.

I strongly agree. But the reasons our narratives of psychology have favoured reasons over reactions have a lot to do with the size and complexity of the societies producing the psychology, and their own economic histories. As you likely already know, these rational-dominant narratives don't operate in all cultures, and so far as I've seen, are nigh impossible to find in pre-agricultural societies. There are whole sections of our own society who don't experience their minds in this way and are baffled when it's unpacked in this form. We're still dealing with the legacy of our history here.

> emotions don’t arise randomly—they are reactions to events that matter to us.

Not always true. Our emotional response is a synthesis of *everything* that's happening, including conditions not tied to a single event. Consider for example, the impact on mood of the state of our gut flora, the impact of immunocompromise on sense of wellbeing, or what happens to endurance athletes over the course of a long period of training. Then there's what happens in a range of psychopathologies where it's hard to tell whether a delusion creates the emotional reaction, or the emotion engenders the delusion. We could equally wonder what's happening in infant and early childhood development too, when emotional reactions are strong, but cognition is still developing.

Emotions can be reactive but the ontological tendency to pigeonhole them this way is a product of a rational-dominant society of contracts and agreements. (I know you're making a similar point, but my point is that it's not just legacy philosophy of mind, but legacy language of mind causing problems here.)

> Emotions are explicitly tied to desired and feared outcomes, reflecting a strong connection to our values and goals.

Not always true. Infants can display a fear of falling while having no idea what's happening. We are wired for emotional responses to some perceptions, regardless of our understanding of incident or apprehension of outcome.

> Emotions can arise both in anticipation of and in reaction to experiences.

And conditions, whether or not we entirely apprehend them -- please see my earlier points.

> Emotions often produce a corresponding action tendency, serving as a source of motivation.

Agreed, but behaviouralism struggles with mechanism here. It's one of the few times when I think it's the wrong framework to use.

> The stronger the emotion, the greater its influence on our decisions.

Rather, on 'responses' -- there may or may not be decisions attached.

> Our emotions are inextricably linked to those goals and values

Even more than that, we have whole human endeavours -- some expensive and risky -- designed principally to produce emotional effect. That's not just art, but crafts, sports, recreations and a range of human interaction styles. We're a social species that cooperates for protection, food-gathering and child-rearing while competing for sex and food, and our emotional responses are all geared around these evolutionary forces. Primatology tells us that we had prelingual signals with emotional effect long before we had complex language to link emotion with consequence. Anthropology shows that we retain and still use these facilities. Not all of this is goal-driven because we may have no conception of what we actually want, and yet feel compelled to act anyway.

> emotions are essential for discerning the value of different decision options

No they aren't, because we have automated decision-systems that can discern value. While popular among philosophers, this argument conflates the innate capacity of emotions to synthesise with the need for all synthesis to be emotional.

It's also a bit of is-ought fallacy: 'emotions are always involved, therefore they're always needed'. A more constructive point is that they're always involved, and therefore unwise to ignore.

> Emotions may help us assign value, but powerful emotions can also override other important pieces of information, narrowing our focus and leading to biased or impulsive decisions.

Yes, but further: emotions are typically short-term, self-focused, tribal syntheses while many of our modern social decisions require us to think in transpersonal terms. The prevalence of careerism, cronyism, factionalism, transactionalism and short-termism in policy selection and design tells us that we struggle with this. (In fact when I try to discuss transpersonal motives with most people, I get blank looks from some, while others think I'm talking metaphysics.)

> While emotions can sometimes complicate our choices, they are ultimately what give decisions their meaning and direction.

No -- they're only *part* of what nourishes our sense of meaning and direction. While it's hard to spontaneously pursue directions contrary to emotional reaction, it's also trainable, and whole cadres of people do it all the time. However 'meaning' and 'direction' might be recognised, they're not purely emotional in all people.

> Ultimately, emotions are neither inherently good nor inherently bad—they are tools.

I disagree. They're only tools in persuasion, entertainment and propaganda. Both experientially and behaviourally they're information, conditions and pressures -- part resource, part constraint. Our tools are therefore methods and techniques for understanding, exploiting, transforming and managing them.

This stuff is tricky yet critical. I love that you're presenting it and look forward to reading more.

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