How Ideological Thinking Amplifies Motivated Reasoning
Even the most analytical minds aren't immune to bias.
This post is the final post in a three-series of exploring motivated reasoning and decision making.
A previous version of this post was published on Psychology Today.

In the first post of this series, I discussed motivated reasoning, which allows us to navigate conflicting goals by aligning decisions with our situationally activated priorities and values. This process is often adaptive; values vary in the degree to which they take precedence in each situation, and there’s often a degree of subjectivity that determines whether a choice is reasonable or not. But motivated reasoning can lead us astray when biases or rationalizations cause us to prioritize immediate needs or deeply held beliefs over evidence or broader priorities.
The second post built on this by exploring how ideological thinking amplifies biases through its doctrinal and relational elements, creating a powerful lens through which adherents interpret the world. The doctrinal element provides the beliefs and rules that guide decision making, while the relational element fosters in-group loyalty and out-group skepticism. Together, these elements explain how ideological adherence not only shapes individual reasoning but also reinforces group dynamics and collective biases, making ideological thinking a significant driver of motivated reasoning.
In this final post, I examine what happens when motivated reasoning intersects with ideological thinking. Specifically, I explore why intelligent, educated, or analytical individuals—those we might expect to be less susceptible to decision-making errors—often reason themselves into dubious or foolish conclusions when strong ideological commitments are involved. This phenomenon highlights not only the power of ideology but also the subtle ways in which it shapes decision making and reinforces itself over time.
Reasoning Into the Desired Outcome
Rather than using a forward, logic-driven process to reach a conclusion—where emotion aids in making a final choice—we often start in reverse. We decide on the option we want and then construct a rationale to justify it. This reverse-engineering of decisions is especially likely when a strongly held goal, value, or belief motivates us toward a particular conclusion In such instances, our emotional connection to the preferred outcome serves as the driver for motivated reasoning. In other words, we let our emotion supersede other evidence. Almost every impulsive decision we make—and many decisions we later regret—result from this reverse engineering.
Take the example of buying a car. Imagine a person deciding between two options: Car A, which is highly reliable and reasonably fuel-efficient, and Car B, which is much less reliable but slightly more fuel-efficient. Objectively, Car A might seem the better choice based on practical criteria. However, the person feels a strong emotional pull toward Car B because of its stylish design, while Car A’s appearance is unremarkable. Although the person claims that reliability is a top priority, this emotional preference for Car B reshapes the decision-making process, overriding practical considerations. Ultimately, he chooses Car B, even though Car A may have been the more sensible choice overall.
This type of reasoning can feel perfectly justified in the moment, especially when the rationale appears credible enough to satisfy our internal sense of logic (e.g., “It might be less reliable, but it’s more fuel-efficient and fuel efficiency really matters too”). In some cases, we might even externalize responsibility for our choice to avoid internal conflict (e.g., “My family preferred Car B, so I went along with it”). The key to this kind of motivated reasoning is our ability to construct sufficient justification for accepting the desired conclusion. If we cannot rationale it convincingly, we’re less likely to act on it.
This tendency to reason backward is not inherently problematic; it’s part of how we navigate competing values and priorities. However, it becomes particularly significant when deeply ingrained belief systems cause us to rationalize decisions that align with those beliefs. Ideological thinking, with its doctrinal rules and relational biases, often amplifies the effects of motivated reasoning. The stronger one’s connection to an ideology, the more pronounced these effects are likely to be. This dynamic helps explain why even intelligent, analytical individuals can reason themselves into conclusions that align with their ideological commitments—often at the expense of evidence or broader priorities.
Ideology Reinforces Motivated Reasoning
This brings me to an argument made by Gurwinder (2022), who provided an explanation for why smart people believe stupid things1. He cited prior research demonstrating that people who possess more analytical thinking skills, basic knowledge of a topic, ability to digest statistical information, or education were more likely to be susceptible to motivated reasoning—if they also possessed strongly held beliefs related to the decision at hand. In other words, people who should have been least susceptible to belief-driven bias (educated, analytical thinkers) were more motivated to reason their way into conclusions consistent with their beliefs.
Moreover, the biases people demonstrated tended to conform to their ideology. This ties into my earlier post on ideological thinking. When we strongly internalize the doctrinal and relational elements of ideological thinking—essentially becoming true believers or zealots—it creates a situation in which those doctrinal beliefs are rarely, if ever, challenged.
This dynamic explains why once intelligent, analytical people adopt an ideological position, they tend to become more susceptible to motivated reasoning. Whereas less educated or less analytical thinkers may be more influenced by external sources (which is problematic in its own right), more analytical ideological thinkers require no such external influence: They are fully capable of reasoning themselves into conclusions that align with their ideological views. In this way, ideological thinking becomes self-reinforcing, as these individuals are both the architects and the audience of their own rationalizations.
This doesn’t explain, though, how analytical thinkers end up enthralled in ideology to begin with. After all, there must be a reason for them to adopt the views in the first place. Though I don’t have any definitive answers here, one likely motivation for this is the human need to fit in or belong to a group.
Bonhoeffer’s Theory of Stupidity argues that social needs are a primary driver of our willingness to suspend critical thinking as it benefits our need to fit in2. The need for acceptance and group identity can be a strong motivator. When strong enough, individuals may prioritize acceptance by the group above other values3, causing them to entertain—and eventually adopt—an ideology’s doctrinal beliefs (Brandt, 2022). From there, more educated, analytical thinkers can simply do the rest, rationalizing and reinforcing those beliefs and deepening their ideological commitments over time.
Key Takeaways
Belief in an ideology can lead to the endorsement of ideas that flow from that ideology, regardless of how questionable, dubious, or even foolish those ideas might be. True believers are not always, or even often, those with less intelligence, education, or analytical thinking. In fact, it is frequently the opposite. Whereas those with less intelligence or education often require ongoing reinforcement to maintain their ideological beliefs, those with more intelligence or education can more easily self-reinforce those beliefs via their own motivated reasoning.
To mitigate the risks of ideologically driven errors in reasoning, I offer two key suggestions:
Cultivate curiosity and humility: Drawing from Gurwinder’s ideas, fostering a genuine desire to learn (curiosity) and keeping one’s ego in check (humility) can decrease the allure of ideological enchantment. Curiosity helps us seek out diverse perspectives and evidence, while humility allows us to question our assumptions and remain open to change.
Avoid echo chambers: As Bonhoeffer argued, environments where a single perspective dominates can erode critical thinking. Actively seeking out spaces that encourage diverse viewpoints and constructive dialogue reduces the risk of blindly accepting ideologically driven ideas without scrutiny.
While these strategies are no guarantee against the pitfalls of ideological thinking or motivated reasoning, they can significantly reduce the likelihood of falling into such traps. By remaining curious, humble, and open to diverse perspectives, we create opportunities to critically evaluate our beliefs and make decisions grounded in evidence rather than unquestioned ideologies.
While smart implies intelligence, almost none of the studies measured intelligence. They measured knowledge, education, reflective thinking, and/or statistical competence.
This is, in effect, what makes intelligent people vulnerable to stupidity.
Such as the value we place in critical thinking
① "The stronger one’s connection to an ideology". The question here becomes why some get so committed. Neo-Pyrrhonists regard this rash and unwise move into dogma with a shake of the head and advise against judging anything in hard and fast lines.
②Mary Douglas regards bias in a matrix which relates them to an individual's perception of risk, but the question then is why some are motivated more by their anxiety about threats and their perceived outcomes, and others less so.
③Ideology is an outcome of the worlding urge, but more derivative than say (religion, morality, polity, art/making special) i.e. it is more worldbuilding, more doubled down, more conscious of its actions, but less considered in realising its ontologies of effort are also not real but socially negotiated. Believing in them (faith in dogma or devoteeist loyalty to group/king) is a conscious choice, which is why the label of false consciousness is so pernicious. People go to a lot of intentional effort to believe, especially in wrong things that they hold dear because of perceived risk to the fraglie nature of those outcomes but not being committed (morality/faith/nature) which substitute in for the world which is a non-accounted cross-insurance and education service, we both use and outsource a lot of our making and doing to. Except in North Korea where the dictator does all of that, don't you worry about that.
④The committed among us, substitute (in for the world) a committment to their favoured outcome (Ideology/morality/religion/identity) and cannot accept the world can continue on without that commitment. This is rash and unwise. Ideology is not a POV in this frame, it is a commitment. IE it is not causal, to repeat, it is a derivative outcome.
⑤Archaeologist Slimak argues this normative push is what differs us as H. sapiens from what we see hinted at in Neanderthal material culture. We need to know when and where it varies, how to chill and not let narcissists push our buttons. see recent posts: https://whyweshould.substack.com/p/unmuddied-ludovic-slimak-essays-the
and
https://whyweshould.substack.com/p/postscript-ludovic-slimak-essays